Weapons of Mass Discussion

Crispy Rice Treats - Part II

From Dr. Rice's Opening Statements:

The terrorist threat to our nation did not emerge on September 11, 2001. Long before that day, radical, freedom-hating terrorists declared war on America and on the civilized world. The attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985, the rise of al-Qaida and the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the attacks on American installations in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, the East Africa bombings of 1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 - these and other atrocities were part of a sustained, systematic campaign to spread devastation and chaos and to murder innocent Americans.

The terrorists were at war with us, but we were not yet at war with them. For more than 20 years, the terrorist threat gathered, and America's response across several administrations of both parties was insufficient. Historically, democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or until it is too late.

The key point in the opening statement is that while the war was declared on us, we had not responded. We were not in a war mindset. If it weren't for 9/11, we'd all still feel like terrorism is a law enforcement issue. Now that it has happened on such a dramatic scale here in the United States, there has been a shift amongst most Americans: we are at war.

On an operational level, therefore, we decided immediately to continue to pursue the Clinton administration's covert action authority and other efforts to fight the network.

President Bush retained George Tenet as direction of central intelligence, and Louis Freeh remained the director of the FBI. And I took the unusual step of retaining Dick Clarke and the entire Clinton administration's counterterrorism team on the NSC staff.

I knew Dick Clarke to be an expert in his field, as well as an experienced crisis manager. Our goal was to ensure continuity of operations while we developed new policies.

Contrary to the testimony of Dick Clarke, action was taken or maintained by the Bush administration prior to 9/11. Clarke himself briefed the press on a number of "upgrades" that the Bush administration engaged to enhance the counterterrorism effort. Funding was increased, new technolgies were explored, ideas were tossed about... To suggest that the new adminsitration did nothing is dishonest.

At the beginning of the administration, President Bush revived the practice of meeting with the director of central intelligence almost every day in the Oval Office, meetings which I attended, along with the vice president and the chief of staff. At these meetings, the president received up-to-date intelligence and asked questions of his most senior intelligence officials.

From January 20th through September 10th, the president received at these daily meetings more than 40 briefing items on al-Qaida, and 13 of those were in response to questions he or his top advisers posed.

In addition to seeing DCI Tenet almost every morning, I generally spoke by telephone to coordinate policy at 7:15 with Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld on a variety of topics, and I also met and spoke regularly with the DCI about al-Qaida and terrorism.

This is an important point. Clinton didn't like Tenet and didn't meet with him but a few times in the eight years he was in office. The Bush administration felt strongly that the CIA was an important agency with information that needed to heard by the President directly.

We also moved to develop a new and comprehensive strategy to try and eliminate the al-Qaida network. President Bush understood the threat, and he understood its importance. He made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al-Qaida one attack at a time. He told me he was tired of swatting flies.

This new strategy was developed over the spring and summer of 2001 and was approved by the president's senior national security officials on September 4th. It was the very first major national security policy directive [NSPD] of the Bush administration -- not Russia, not missile defense, not Iraq, but the elimination of al-Qaida.

This is another refutation of Clarke's testimony. By testifying that the very first NSPD was about al Qaeda, Rice torpedos Clarke's assertion that the Bush administration was disengaged. The strategy that the Bush adminsitration intended to employ was one with the goal of elimination, rather than containment, of the al Qaeda network. Developing such a strategy, essentially from scratch, takes time; it is important to note that while the administration was developing this strategy, they maintained and enhanced the Clinton strategy.

This was a change from the prior strategy - Presidential Decision Directive 62, signed in 1998 - which ordered the secretary of defense to provide transportation to bring individual terrorists to the U.S. for trial, to protect DOD forces overseas, and to be prepared to respond to terrorist and weapons-of-mass-destruction incidents.

While the Clinton strategy seemed reasonable at this time, it is clear now that taking a law enforcement approach was not effective deterrent.

An important point, is that the Bush team realized that they were going to need help from other countries. The administration went to work to find ways to get at al Qaeda with the cooperation of Afghanistan's neighbors. The Clinton strategy was heavily dependent on the Northern Alliance. However, a satisfactory relationship with Pakistan could not be reached at the time.

America's al-Qaida policy wasn't working because our Afghanistan policy wasn't working, and our Afghanistan policy wasn't working because our Pakistan policy wasn't working.

A number of regional experts were brought in to assist in the policy development. The counterterror policy was married to foreign policy in a new way. Efforts to get Pakistan to decrease support for the Taliban with a "carrot and stick" approach was slow in getting results but was succeeding. In order to provide some stability in the region, India needed to be brought on board as well. All of this diplomatic activity took time. Time that we ultimately didn't have, as it turns out.

Most often, though, the threat reporting was frustratingly vague. Let me read you some of the actual chatter that was picked up in that spring and summer:

"Unbelievable news coming in weeks," said one.

"Big event - there will be a very, very, very, very big uproar."

"There will be attacks in the near future."

Troubling, yes. But they don't tell us when; they don't tell us where; they don't tell us who; and they don't tell us how.

In this context, I want to address in some detail one of the briefing items that we did receive, since its content has been frequently mischaracterized.

What was she supposed to do with this information. Had the alarm been raised, the Partisan Media (tm) would have laughed at the new administration and noithing would have come of it. Well, what did she do with it...

And on July 5th, Chief of Staff Andy Card and I met with Dick Clarke, and I asked Dick to make sure that domestic agencies were aware of the heightened threat period and were taking appropriate steps to respond, even though we did not have specific threats to the homeland.

Later that same day, Clarke convened a special meeting of his CSG, as well as representatives from the FAA, the INS, Customs and the Coast Guard. At that meeting, these agencies were asked to take additional measures to increase security and surveillance.

Throughout the period of heightened threat information, we worked hard on multiple fronts to detect, protect against and disrupt any terrorist plans or operations that might lead to an attack.

For instance, the Department of Defense issued at least five urgent warnings to U.S. military forces that al-Qaida might be planning a near-term attack and placed our military forces in certain regions on heightened alert.

The State Department issued at least four urgent security advisers and public worldwide cautions on terrorist threats, enhanced security measures at certain embassies, and warned the Taliban that they would be held responsible for any al-Qaida attack on U.S. interests.

The FBI issued at least three nationwide warnings to federal, state and law enforcement agencies and specifically stated that, although the vast majority of the information indicated overseas targets, attacks against the homeland could not be ruled out.

The FBI tasked all 56 of its U.S. field offices to increase surveillance of known suspects of terrorists and to reach out to known informants who might have information on terrorist activities.

The FAA issued at least five civil aviation security information circulars to all U.S. airlines and airport security personnel, including specific warnings about the possibility of hijacking.

The CIA worked around the clock to disrupt threats worldwide. Agency officials launched a wide-ranging disruption effort against al-Qaida in more than 20 countries.

And during this period, the vice president, Director Tenet and members of my staff called senior foreign officials, requesting that they increase their intelligence assistance and report to us any relevant threat information.

This is a brief sample of our intense activity in the high threat period of the summer of 2001. Yet, as your hearings have shown, there was no silver bullet that could have prevented the 9-11 attacks.

Even with all that activity, no other one event, short of capturing a conspirator, was going to prevent 9/11. And I think the capture of a terrorist in on the plot would have advanced their time table rather than disrupt the plan altogether.

Good finisher here:

In hindsight, if anything might have helped stop 9-11, it would have been better information about threats inside the United States - something made very difficult by structural and legal impediments that prevented the collection and sharing of information by our law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

That's really all that needs said, folks.

Mark's Remarks

1. Dr. Rice lays out that Bush was NOT disengaged, in fact he was quite "with it" in regards to terrorism...he tried to keep the team in place from Clinton to better keep him informed....

2. Dick Clarke is simply an opportunistic liar. Dr. Rice lays out the plans that were being done with context, refuting Clarke's testimony. Of course, Clarke refutes his own testimony over and over, like the press briefing where he said Bush was spending five times of what Clinton did on CounterTerrorism BEFORE 9/11. This administration was working hard to push forward the Predator, and other ideas. To say this admin did nothing is an out and out lie.

3. Condi discusses how engaged the President was by bringing up the key point: Bush met with Tenet about every day....Clinton met with him about 3 times over EIGHT YEARS!!!!! The Bush admin strongly understood the importance of intelligence, and this is a point in their favor. These daily meetings seem to show that the President was up to speed and engaged in international affairs and was watching them as closely as possible.

4. This administration was working on a comprehensive strategy, not just something to win headlines today, but to change the face of the world. These type of plans take time....You cannot reinvent the intelligence and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States in 200 days, especially after a hotly contested election. Think about that, just a little, eh? This admin was working to reinvent the government to better counter the threat, but unfortunately, IN HINDSIGHT, we did not have that kind of time, or that amount of cooperation.

5. Terrorism as a law enforcement matter is a failed strategy--we have 1993 WTC, the Khobar Towers, the Embassies, and the Cole...all were treated as law enforcement, and what did that do to stop terror? Nothing. Further evidence that while the enemies were in war mode, we were not....


6. The terror warnings of something big: contrary to what the Partisan Media(tm) and the Liberal Hacks on this commission say, this administration DID NOT ignore the warnings...they did everything possible to get the word out, to alert the relevant organizations....The Press would have ridiculed Bush's admin if we would have battened down the hatches over such generalized warnings, and libs know it...however, it doesn't make for good theater, so they smear...it doesn't use the rage of the 9/11 families as a political tool, so they bend and twist issues....Dr. Rice explains that everything that could be done was being done....

7. Condi hits it on the head, what a shame that Bin Vineste, Roemer, and Kerrey don't see this, even though witness after witness after witness has said it....there were too many impediments of information that were too well entrenched....But, that doesn't help to influence an election, so let's play the blame card.....