Victory in Iraq: Political Track

Resource: National Strategy for Victory in Iraq

Of all ofthree tracks, the political track is the one I am most concerned about. Here are the assumptions that this track is based on:

o First, like people in all parts of the world, from all cultures and religions, when given the opportunity, the Iraqi people prefer to live in freedom rather than under tyranny.

o Second, a critical mass of Iraqis in all areas of the country will not embrace the perverse vision offered by the terrorists. Most rejectionists can over time be persuaded to no longer seek the privileges of dictatorship -- and in exchange will embrace the rewards of democratic stability.

o Third, an enduring democracy is not built through elections alone: critical components include transparent, effective institutions and a national constitutional compact.

o Fourth, federalism is not a precursor to the breakup of Iraq, but instead is a prerequisite for a united country and better governance. Federalism allows a strong central government to exercise the powers of a sovereign state, while enabling regional bodies to make decisions that protect the interests of local populations.

o Fifth, it is in the fundamental interests of all Iraqi communities -- and of the region -- that Iraq stays a united country. This shared objective creates space for compromise across ethnic and religious divides and for the steady growth of national institutions.

o Sixth, Iraq needs and can receive the support of the region and the international community to solidify its successes.

I'm a big believer in the transformative power of democracy. I do believe that people would choose freedom over tyranny if given a choice. So put me down as "in favor" of assumptions 1, 2, and (especially) 3.

The fourth deals with federalism and the perception among some that a strong central government will lead to a breakup of Iraq. Nonsense. So long as corruption is dealt with and the political power properly distributed, there is no reason to believe that a federal Iraq would fall apart. Those who advocate this position really aren't taking in to account the national identity that Iraqis have as a whole. #4 is a good assumption to base the political track on...#5 asserts the importance of a unified Iraq. I'm all for it.

The sixth assumption is that Iraq needs support from the "international community" to solidify its success. Depending on what support you are talking about, I'd agree...if you are talking about sending men and material to help Iraq protect itself, I'm all for international assistance. If you are talking about something else, I'm not interested. And I'm not real keen on the parts of the "international community" that aren't willing to contribute to the cause without "getting something" in return.

The logic behind this track is right on target:

Our efforts and those of the Iraqis on the political track are geared toward isolating hard-core rejectionists by expanding avenues for political participation at all levels of government, engaging the region and all Iraqi communities to demonstrate that there is a place for all groups in the new Iraq, and building national Iraqi institutions and international support to advance the rule of law and offer the Iraqi people a solid framework for a better and more peaceful future.

All of this will take some time. How much time? Nobody knows. That is why timetables are stupid. It will take however long it takes.

There is one section here (on page 15) that I don't think is a reasonable assumption to make at all:

Due to the historical, cultural, political, and economic links between Iraq and its neighbors, many surrounding countries can help Iraq secure its borders and encourage Sunni rejectionists to renounce violence and enter the political process.

The problem that I see with counting on this happening is that the neighboring governments aren't exactly looking forward to democracy working in Iraq. Why? Because once people in the region start looking at a stable, free, and democratic Iraq, they are going to want it too. I can't forsee Iran going along with this. Saudi Arabia isn't exactly looking forward to it either.

The heart of the matter though is here:

Expanding international support for Iraq will demonstrate to Iraqis and the world that Iraq is a valuable member of the international community and will further broaden the political and economic support provided to Iraq.

I can't stress this enough...this is what the whole thing is about.

The next section is all about the progress that has been made in the political track. It is all good information and is the real story of Iraq that still isn't being told by the partisan media.

Closing out the track is a section on "continued challenges" in the political sphere that are well worth taking a look at:

o Ensuring that those who join the political process leave behind violence entirely;

o Building national institutions when past divisions and current suspicions have led many Iraqis to look to regional or sectarian bodies to protect their interests;

o Nurturing a culture of reconciliation, human rights, and transparency in a society scarred by three decades of arbitrary violence and rampant corruption;

o Building political movements based on issues and platforms, instead of identity;

o Encouraging cooperation across ethnic, religious and tribal divides when many wounds are still fresh and have been exacerbated by recent hardships;

o Convincing all regional states to welcome and actively support the new Iraqi state politically and financially;

o Building ministerial capacity to advance effective government and reduce corruption.

These are the political challenges that we're facing in Iraq. I would have liked to have seen some thoughts on what to do about these challenges and I will assume that somebody is applying brain power to these challenges, but it would have been nice to see evidence of that here.

All in all, I have to say that the political track is going to be the hardest to judge our progress. Security and economics have metrics that can help us figure out where we're at, but politics have no metrics. The most important thing is to make sure that the "end state" of a free, stable, democratic Iraq is achieved. How and when that happens are the unknowns...and are best left to the Iraqis themselves.