The first question that is asked by war critics deals with whether or not there was a "plan" for the war. Clearly, there was and we did win the war. The problem lies not with the plan, but rather the aftermath of the plan. Franks' war plan, which was approved by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and President Bush, consisted of four phases: Phase I consisted of staging men and materials close to the expected combat zone without triggering a war all by itself; Phase II was to be a special forces and an air campaign designed to "shock and awe" the enemy; Phase III was the decisive combat operations phase using both air and ground forces; and finally, Phase IV was the post-hostility operations phase of reconstruction.
As the plan matured from a commander's intent to a concept to an actual plan, it was realized that certain phases could be compressed. Franks wanted to employ what amounted to a five front assault on Iraq in as short a time as possible. The brilliance of the plan was its flexibility. Franks was able to compress Phase I and II fairly easily. Even though Phase II didn't produce many "CNN moments", Phase III was compressed due to the success of Phase II.
The original plan pegged Phases I as lasting 60 days; Phase II, 3 weeks; and Phase III, up to 135 days. The revised timeline compressed it down to 45 days, 90 days, and 90 days in a variation of the plan called RUNNING START. (Source: Page 389 - this and all subsequent page numbers will be from the hardcover edition of Franks' book),
The problem is Phase IV.
Phase IV
On page 366, we learn that the timelines were well known in advance. Rumsfeld is quoted as saying, "And all of this is predicated on Phase I preparations having been completed?" Franks says yes, but the focus of the discussion is clearly on Phase II and III with no mention of Phase IV. This leaves us with the impression that by moving to Phase II, Franks has everything he needs in place for all of the subsequent phases of the plan, including Phase IV.The second question from critics deals with the number of troops involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Clearly, Franks had exactly what he needed to pull of the invasion successfully, although Secretary of State Colin Powell had his doubts, which were expressed to the President and the National Security Council. Powell was known for advocating the use of "overwhelming force" in Operation Desert Storm; "overwhelming" in terms of numbers. To Franks and the post Desert Storm military, "overwhelming" referred to their technological and strategic advantages.
Franks didn't need more than 250,000 troops for the "war," but did he need more than that for Phase IV of the plan? The answer depends on what the realistic expectations of the conditions in Iraq at the end of major combat operations.
Phase IV of Franks' plan had four objectives: 1) to stand up a new Iraqi army and create a police force that included a representative tribal, religious and ethnic mix. [Franks quotes himself as saying, "It will take time." so he knows that this is no easy task.] 2) well designed and well funded reconstruction projects that will employ large numbers of Iraqis that will also quickly meet community needs and expectations. [When you hear about missing millions of dollars, my educated guess is that those funds disappeared in to these projects – there wasn't time to account for every dollar the military spent on these projects.] 3) begin drawing down American forces from 250,000 to a core strength of at least 50,000. 4) the exit strategy was tied to effective Iraqi governance, not some arbitrary timeline. [This was a key part of the plan from the very beginning. It is smart planning, really, because it is objective based and not time based. Is it better to fight a war fought on time but in which you fail to achieve the objective?]
The first objective was going to be difficult and time consuming no matter how quickly he was going to be able to recruit and train Iraqis. The short cut that was planned was to recruit directly from the best units of the existing Iraqi army; but as it turned out, very few units actually surrendered together – most Iraqi soldiers just took off the uniform and went home (Source: page 419). The idea was to treat the Iraqi army like the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Paul Bremer eventually barred the Iraqi army units from being used for this purpose as part of his de-Baathification process of the Iraqi government at any rate, so Franks' plan on this objective had little chance of success from the beginning.
Now that we have mentioned the two key elements behind my theory, let's identify the two real problems: Iraq was not Afghanistan and Iraq had no equivalent to Hamid Karzai.
The first one speaks for itself [Iraq has three major population groups – Shiite, Sunni, and Kurds - whereas Afghanistan had only two factions – Taliban and not Taliban, mostly Pashtun], so let's take the last one. Hamid Karzai was a beloved leader in exile and there was no doubt that he had the support that would be needed to lead Afghanistan after the invasion. For Iraq, the US thought that Ahmed Chalabi might fit a similar role. Unfortunately, in reality he didn't have the support of all the factions and it was decided to create a Provisional Authority. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer was brought in to head up the interim government while the Iraqis straightened things out for themselves.
The first mistake in planning that was made was in assuming that the same ideas that worked for Afghanistan would work for Iraq. The second mistake in planning was not clearly knowing what the conditions should look like for the startup of Phase IV.
"Mission Accomplished"?
It became clear that the major combat operations had ceased, but the insurgency was having an effect. Franks knew that there were other countries who had pledged to help train Iraqis that were sitting on the sidelines waiting for the war to be over. The British were planning a victory parade for their returning troops and Franks suggested something similar to signal the end of Phase III. On May 1, 2003, President Bush rode out to a carrier and proclaimed their mission in Iraq a success. It should be pointed out that at no time did the president indicate that there wasn't still a lot of work to be done in Iraq. This event had, what Franks called, "unintended consequences."As mentioned earlier, the insurgency was picking up strength during this time period and Phase IV was hitting a few snags as well. Franks and Rumsfeld had brought in a former general named Jay Garner to head up the reconstruction effort. Garner's program was seriously under funded and under staffed which caused all sorts of problems in achieving the objectives of Phase IV. By this time, Chalabi had arrived and the Iraqis fail to step up and govern themselves. And the policemen just disappeared fearing retribution from the civilian population who had suffered under Saddam's brutal regime (Source: page 524).
Catastrophic Success
One of the problems with the post-combat phase was that the planners weren't real sure what Iraq was going to look like after combat. Remember, there were predictions of a massive humanitarian crisis and thousands to millions dead. I suspect that the planners of the post-combat phase were amazed at how few of those predictions came to pass. Franks called it a "catastrophic success" because the combat actions went so well, that the plans that they had were useless due to the situation on the ground that was so dramatically different than what planners planned for...Is it going well? That's a fair question. I think so. And that is based on a few different sources. First, the milbloggers who have actually been there. Secondly, Saddam is no longer raping, murdering, and pillaging his country and its people. (Source ) And thirdly, we have made some tremendous progress in restoring infrastructure, health and educational services, expanding economic opportunity, improving government efficiency and accountability, and humanitarian assistance. Get the details on that from this source.
Are there problems? Sure. Those pesky terrorists just aren't giving up without a fight. But 80% of the country is relatively peaceful and calm...especially when compared to Chicago or New York...heck, even Cincinnati... Notice how the trouble seems to be happening in the same places...
Was it planned well?. The major combat operations were planned flawlessly. I don't think there is any reasonable dissent on that issue. The post-combat operations phase? Not so well planned. We've pretty much recovered, but it should never have happened in the first place.
